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The Narrow Approach to Substantive Legitimate Expectations 
and the Trend of Modern Authority 
JOE TOMLINSON 
University of Sheffield 
In the recent Privy Council decision of United Policyholders Group v Attorney General of Trinidad and 
Tobago, Lord Carnwath supplied an interesting and helpful discussion of substantive legitimate expectations. 
This case note UHIOHFWVRQ/RUG&DUQZDWK¶VFRQFOXVLRQVDQGKRZWKH\VSHDNWRLPSRUWDQW current debates about 
the doctrine. In particular, it will be argued that /RUG &DUQZDWK¶V conclusions provoke reflection on: (a) the 
status of the seminal Coughlan case in contemporary thinking about the doctrine; (b) how far claims about the 
advent of the protection of substantive expectations representing a worrying expansion of judicial power have 
been properly investigated; (c) whether it is necessary to reflect deeply on the theoretical basis of the principle; 
DQG G WKH GHIHQVLELOLW\ RI WKH µWUHQG RI PRGHUQ DXWKRULW\¶ WR LQWHUSUHW WKH GLFWD LQ WKH &RXJK lan case 
µQDUURZO\¶ 
Key words: substantive legitimate expectations; judicial review; judicial power; common law; Privy Council 
1 Introduction 
The doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations in English and Welsh public law has, for 
the most part, been the product of the Court of Appeal. It was the Court of Appeal²
consisting of Sedley, Woolf, and Mummery LJJ²that controversially pronounced the 
existence of the substantive dimension of the doctrine.1 It was also the Court of Appeal²
often through the judgments of Laws LJ²that refined the contours of the doctrine in the 
subsequent decade and a half.2 Whether the Court of Appeal deserves praise or blame, or 
both, for its handiwork has been a matter of intense debate in the UK, Commonwealth 
jurisdictions, and beyond.3 But where was the UK Supreme Court during all of this?4  
                                                          

 j.p.tomlinson@sheffield.ac.uk 
1
 R v North and East Devon Health Authority ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213 (Court of Appeal (CA)). 
2
 R (Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 (CA); R (Niazi) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 755 (CA). 
3
 See generally: Mark (OOLRWWµFrom Heresy to Orthodoxy: Substantive Legitimate Expectations in English 
3XEOLF /DZ¶ LQ 0atthew Groves and Greg Weeks (eds), Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law 
World (Hart Publishing 2017); 3DXO &UDLJ µ6XEVWDQWLYH /HJLWLPDWH ([SHFWDWLRQV DQG WKH 3ULQFLSOHV RI
-XGLFLDO5HYLHZ¶LQ0DGV$QGHQDVHGEnglish Public Law and the Common Law of Europe (Key Haven 
1998); Christopher )RUV\WKµ/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQV5HYLVLWHG¶(2011) 16 Judicial Review 429. 
4
 Or its predecessor, the judicial House of Lords. 
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On occasion, the highest court has heard arguments about substantive expectations and, 
on even rarer occasion, it had provided some obiter comment. 5  Nonetheless, since the 
seminal Court of Appeal case of R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority ex p Coughlan, 
where the doctrine was introduced,6 the Supreme Court has not provided a comprehensive 
review of this area of law. It would perhaps go too far to suggest that there is a paralysis in 
the Supreme Court when it comes to reflecting seriously upon the common law grounds for 
substantive review (despite the issue being expertly avoided in recent cases).7 It is clear, 
however, that the law relating to substantive legitimate expectations²much like the idea of 
common law proportionality²merits a long overdue authoritative review. While the UK 
Supreme Court has not yet conducted such a review, the Privy Council²consisting of 
Supreme Court Justices Lord Neuberger, Lord Carnwath, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, and Lord 
Sumption²confronted the issue of substantive legitimate expectations head-on in The United 
Policyholders Group v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago.8 In the absence of any 
clear statement from the Supreme Court on substantive legitimate expectations, the judgment 
in this case²particularly that provided by Lord Carnwath²offers an especially useful and 
interesting discussion of the present state of the doctrine. 
In this case note, the conclusions reached in Lord Carnwath¶Vjudgment are analysed in 
the context of important current debates about the doctrine. In particular, it is argued that they 
provoke reflection on: (a) the status of the seminal Coughlan case in contemporary thinking 
about the doctrine; (b) how far claims about the advent of the protection of substantive 
expectations representing a worrying expansion of judicial power have been properly 
investigated; (c) whether it is necessary to reflect deeply on the theoretical basis of the 
SULQFLSOHDQGGWKHGHIHQVLELOLW\RIWKHµWUHQGRIPRGHUQDXWKRULW\¶WRLQWHUSUHWWKHGLFWDLQ
                                                          
5
 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2008] UKHL 61 (House 
of Lords (HL)). 
6
 Coughlan (n 1). 6RPHUHIHUWR6HGOH\-¶VMXGJPHQWLQR v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p 
Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 714 (QB) as the seminal case in the development of 
substantive legitimate expectations. However, that judgment, despite its influence, was a first instance 
GHFLVLRQWKDWZDVRYHUUXOHGDQGFRQGHPQHGDVµKHUHV\¶LQR v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ex p Hargreaves [1997] 1 WLR 906 (CA). 
7
 Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2015] UKSC 69 (Supreme Court (SC)); 
Youssef v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2016] UKSC 3 (SC). See generally: 
Jake Rylatt and Joe 7RPOLQVRQµ6RPHWKLQJ1HZLQ6XEVWDQWLYH5HYLHZ¶(2016) 21 Judicial Review 204. 
8
 [2016] UKPC 17. The Privy Council has dealt with some important legitimate expectations cases 
throughout the life of the doctrine, an important recent example being Rainbow Insurance Company 
Limited v The Financial Services Commission and others (Mauritius) [2015] UKPC 15. 
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WKH&RXJKODQFDVHLQDµQDUURZ¶ZD\,WLVDUJXHGWKDW/RUG&DUQZDWK¶VMXGJPHQWXOWLPDWHO\
reveals an approach which is²in view of present discussion, experience, and knowledge²
both pragmatic and justified.    
2 The United Policyholders Group Case 
The United Policyholders Group9 case concerned a challenge to a decision from the Court of 
Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago. The appellants were holders of life policies which were 
issued by an insurance company. That company ran into trouble following a banking crisis in 
2009. In 2009, the then government provided assurances that all terms and conditions 
contained within extant life policy contracts would be fulfilled. These assurances were the 
basis upon which the appellants claimed to have a legitimate expectation when, following the 
2010 election in Trinidad and Tobago, the new government failed to follow through with its 
predecessRU¶VSURPLVHV7KHDSSHOODQWVDUJXHGWKHQHZLQFXPEHQWVZHUHOHJDOO\ERXQGGXH
to the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations, to act in line with the initial assurances.  
 That argument succeeded at first instance in the High Court but was unsuccessful in 
the Court of Appeal. Thus, it fell to the Privy Council to answer two questions: (a) did the 
IRUPHU JRYHUQPHQW¶V  DVVXUDQFHV JLYH ULVH WR D OHJLWLPDWH H[SHFWDWLRQ DQG E LI VR
could the new, post-2010 government lawfully not honour those assurances? It was 
unanimously concluded by the Privy Council that the appeal was to be rejected. On the first 
question, the Privy Council held that the appellants had a legitimate expectation, as a result of 
WKH SUHYLRXV JRYHUQPHQW¶V DVVXUDQFHV that the nHZ JRYHUQPHQW ZRXOG µmake good the 
deficit in [the insurance company's] Statutory Fund ... and [the insurance company] would be 
placed in a position to fulfil all of its obligations including that of the claiPDQWV¶.10 This was 
the case because the macro-economic implications of the assurances did not affect the 
question of whether a legitimate expectation arose or not. Instead, those implications fell to 
be assessed as part of the second question, ie whether it was permissible for the government 
not to adhere to their prior promises.11 The crux of the failure of this appeal was thus held to 
                                                          
9
  United Policyholders (n 8). 
10
 ibid [51]; see generally [41]±[51]. 
11
 ibid [49]±[51]. Though this will not be discussed here, this part of the judgment seems to illustrate the 
3ULY\&RXQFLOIDYRXULQJWKHµTXHVWLRQRIIDFW¶YLHZRIOHJLWLPDF\RYHUWKHµQRUPDWLYH¶YLHZ of the same. 
For discussion, see: Jack :DWVRQµ&ODULW\DQGDPELJXLW\DQHZDSSURDFKWRWKHWHVWRIOHJLWLPDF\LQWKH 
ODZRIOHJLWLPDWHH[SHFWDWLRQV¶ (2010) 30 Legal Studies 633. 
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EH UHODWHG WR WKH VHFRQGTXHVWLRQ7KH JRYHUQPHQW¶V DVVXUDQFHVKDGFOHDU DQG VHYHUH
macro-economic and macro-political implications. Given this finding, and the further finding 
that appropriate attention was indeed given by the new government to the existence and effect 
of the assurances before they were abandoned,12 the Privy Council held that the respondents 
could resile from the legitimate expectation lawfully.13 
/RUG 1HXEHUJHU JDYH WKH OHDG MXGJPHQW LQ WKH FDVH EXW LW LV /RUG &DUQZDWK¶V MXGJPHQW
which provided a detailed review of the substantive legitimate expectations doctrine, that will 
be the subject of careful reflection here. Though Lord Carnwath WKRXJKWWKDWLWZDVµnot the 
occasion for detDLOHGUHFRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶ of the doctrine, he did add some forty-two paragraphs 
RI FRQFXUULQJ MXGJPHQW µto offer some thoughts as WR WKH SUHVHQW VWDWH RI WKH ODZ¶.14 After 
recognising that the doctrine is a source RI µFRQWLQXLQJ FRQWURYHUV\¶ and considering the 
extensive academic debate surrounding it, 15  Lord Carnwath traced the doctrine from its 
SURFHGXUDO RULJLQV LQ /RUG 'HQQLQJ¶V MXGJPHQW LQ Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home 
Affairs 16 to the present day²covering everything from the pre-Coughlan, µnot quitH¶ 
substantive expectation cases17 to the more ethereal excursions of Laws LJ in examining the 
underlying values of the doctrine.18 This review of the case law will be a useful source of 
learned and comprehensive analysis for practitioners and academics alike, especially in the 
conspicuous absence of comprehensive Supreme Court comment in this area. Following his 
review of the case law, Lord Carnwath went on to reflect on the doctrine and made multiple 
comments abouWWKHQDWXUHDQGGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHGRFWULQH+HUHWKUHHRI/RUG&DUQZDWK¶V
conclusions are brought into focus. 
                                                          
12
 ibid [60]±[78]. 
13
 ibid >@ )RU MXGLFLDO GLVFXVVLRQ RI KRZ VXFK µPDFUR-HFRQRPLF LPSOLFDWLRQV¶ DIIHFW WKH DVVHVVPHQW RI
legality in substantive expectations cases, see: R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment ex p 
Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115, 1130. 
14
 United Policyholders (n 8) [80]. 
15
 ibid [79]±[81]. 
16
 [1969] 2 Ch 149, [1969] 2 WLR 337 (CA). 
17
 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Asif Mahmood Khan [1984] 1 WLR 1337 (CA); R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Ruddock [1987] 1 WLR 1482 (QB). 
18
 See for instance: Nadarajah (n 2). 
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3 &RXJKODQ¶V%URDG'LVFXVVLRQDQG1DUURZ2XWFRPH 
LRUG&DUQZDWKREVHUYHV WKDWKLV µreview of Coughlan and the later cases reveals a striking 
contrast between, on the one hand, the relatively narrow scope of the actual decision in that 
case, and, on the other, the wide-ranging and open-ended QDWXUHRI WKH OHJDO GLVFXVVLRQ¶.19 
This statement raises interesting questions. 
 First, how far is the judgment in Coughlan paradigmatic of the doctrine as it stands 
now? Nowadays, the status of Coughlan as a seminal case vis-à-vis legitimate expectations 
and public law is firmly entrenched. This is evidenced by how many key student and 
practitioner texts still portray Coughlan as the paradigm instance of the application of 
substantive legitimate expectations. This is also evidenced by how Hughes, in a recent 
collection on the topic of Landmark Cases in Public Law, offers the following analysis of the 
FDVH¶VVWDWXUH 
[I]t is fair to say that Coughlan identified the boundaries of legitimate expectations, is part of 
the development of modern broader principles of administrative law, that it set out some 
guidance, which needed to be refined in subsequent cases (and will continue to be refined), 
and that it marked a clear turning point in history. Thus Coughlan can be seen to be a 
lighthouse beaming across the water± providing a level of protection not seen in other cases. 
It can also be seen to be a flag staking out unchartered territory. And finally it can be seen to 
be a red and white buoy bobbing along in the sea of administrative law, supporting its own 
weight, with its head firmly above the water, yet open to new currents and direction.20 
3XWWLQJ DVLGH WKH FDVH¶V VWDWXV in the modern history of public law, what does the 
judgment in Coughlan really tell us about how the doctrine is actually applied by the courts? I 
would sugJHVWWKHFRUUHFWDQVZHUWREHµQRWPXFK¶. 
The Coughlan decision²or at leaVW KRZ LW ZDV H[SUHVVHG LQ WKH µwide-ranging and 
open-HQGHG¶ judgment²was potentially a high watermark for judicial interventionism in this 
area. 21  The vast majority of substantive legitimate expectations cases since could be 
considered as centering on routine bureaucratic issues, in contrast to the high-stakes issues in 
                                                          
19
 United Policyholders (n 8) [110]. 
20
 Kristy +XJKHV µCoughlan DQG WKH 'HYHORSPHQW RI 3XEOLF /DZ¶ LQ 0aurice Sunkin and Satvinder Juss 
(eds), Landmark Cases in Public Law (Hart Publishing 2017). 
21
  United Policyholders (n 8) [110]. 
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Coughlan.22  In addition, the decision in the case itself²GHVSLWHWKH&RXUWRI$SSHDO¶VFODLP
that the impliFDWLRQVRI WKHLUGHFLVLRQZHUHµILQDQFLDORQO\¶ being slightly glib in the highly 
polycentric context of health resource allocation23²was narrowly confined to a particular set 
of facts. As Lord Carnwath explains: 
[T]he court emphasised in its application of legal principle to the facts, Coughlan concerned 
an express promise by the authority for its own purposes, made in unqualified terms to a 
small group of people with whom it had an established relationship, and relied on by them, 
and given for the specific purpose of persuading them to move out of premises which the 
authority wished to have available for other purposes.24 
Perhaps more importantly than these reasons, the courts have now, across sixteen years 
of case law, set out detailed guidance about how legality is to be determined where a 
substantive expectation has been disappointed.25 This case-law guidance, consisting of the 
elucidation of various relevant factors, now bears far more relevance to the practical task of 
judicial decision-making than a broad, sixteen-year-old judgment. There is a general lesson 
here about the rLVN RI XQWKLQNLQJO\ SRUWUD\LQJ µEUHDNWKURXJK¶ cases in the common law as 
paradigmatic beyond the time of their actual, practical importance. Lord Carnwath appears, 
however, to attribute some fault to the Court of $SSHDOIRUWKLVVWDWLQJWKDWµ[w]ith hindsight, 
it appears that the court in Coughlan may have been unnecessarily ambitious in seeking a 
grand unifying theory for all the authorities loosely grouped under the general heading of 
OHJLWLPDWHH[SHFWDWLRQ¶.26 This may well be true but there is certainly also an element here of 
being realistic about what we can expect of seminal cases like Coughlan. Legitimate 
expectations, like other general principles RI MXGLFLDO UHYLHZ µhas not followed inexorably 
from an DJUHHGVHWRIILUVWSULQFLSOHV¶.27 Nor could it be reasonably expected to. 
                                                          
22
 This is similar to the distinction drawn between bureaucratic and policy judicial reviews in: Peter Cane, 
µ8QGHUVWDQGLQJ -XGLFLDO 5HYLHZ DQG LWV ,PSDFW¶ LQ 0arc Hertogh and Simon Halliday (eds), Judicial 
Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge University 
Press 2004), 18-19. 
23
 See generally: Keith Syrett, Law, Legitimacy and the Rationing of Health Care:  A Contextual and 
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
24
 United Policyholders Group (n 8) [110]. 
25
 Richard Moules, Actions Against Public Officials: Legitimate Expectations, Misstatements and Misconduct 
(Sweet & Maxwell 2009), ch 1. 
26
 United Policyholders Group (n 8) [112]. 
27
 Paul 'DO\µ$3OXUDOLVW$FFRXQWRI'HIHUHQFHDQG/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQV¶LQ0atthew Groves and Greg 
Weeks (eds), Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law World (Hart Publishing 2017). 
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 Another question is prompted by Lord &DUQZDWK¶V REVHUYDWLRQ RQ WKH µrelatively 
narrow scope of the actual decision in [Coughlan], and« the wide-ranging and open-ended 
QDWXUHRIWKHOHJDOGLVFXVVLRQ¶KRZVKRXOG judicial power be measured? Lord Carnwath was 
entirely accurate in pointing out the dissonance between the discussion in Coughlan and the 
outcome reached in that case. Many critics of substantive legitimate expectations consider 
themselves as such because they fear that the doctrine represents the judiciary straying 
beyond their appropriate institutional and constitutional limits.28 In other words, the courts 
are, from the standpoint of such critics, perceived as inappropriately conducting so-called 
µPHULWVUHYLHZ¶. Much of that critique is premised on discussions in judgments.29 Certainly, 
what is said in judgments is of crucial importance in advancing and assessing claims about 
increased and potentially excessive judicial power. But this is only one means of assessing 
judicial power. Another means is looking at outcomes ie the eventual results that the cases 
have actually brought about.30 If one was to advance a claim about a legal principle usurping 
the decision-making powers of public authorities, it would be of great concern²perhaps of 
greater concern than what is merely said in judgments²to build a detailed account about the 
extent to which such powers are actually usurped in practice through the outcomes of cases. 
This is especially so given that one does not have to be a hardline legal realist to 
acknowledge that the form of common law judgments is a somewhat artificial mode of 
communication.31 There is no detailed empirical study of the impact of legitimate substantive 
expectations cases²though such a study would be of great value. If one was to venture an 
observation on outcomes, it would be that it is fairly difficult to find cases where substantive 
legitimate expectations arguments have succeeded, and more difficult still to find cases where 
the court have actually directed the public authority concerned to uphold the expectation. In 
fact, it is highly likely that there are, collectively, more monographs, journal articles, and 
                                                          
28
 See for instance: Cameron 6WHZDUWµ6XEVWDQWLYH8QIDLUQHVV$1HZ6SHFLHVRI$EXVHRI3RZHU"¶
28 Federal Law Review )RUV\WKµ/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQ5HYLVLWHG
Q2QWKHLGHDRIWKHFRXUWV
having constitutional and institutional limitations, see: Jeffrey -RZHOO µOf Vires and Vacuums: The 
CoQVWLWXWLRQDO &RQWH[W RI -XGLFLDO 5HYLHZ¶ in Christopher Forsyth (ed), Judicial Review and the 
Constitution (Hart Publishing 2000) 330.  
29
  e.g. )RUV\WKµ/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQ5HYLVLWHG
Q; Cameron, µ6XEVWDQWLYH8QIDLUQHVV$1HZ6SHFLHV
of Abuse of 3RZHU"¶ (n 28). 
30
 This approach underpins the analysis in Robert 7KRPDV µ/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVDQG WKH6HSDUDWLRQRI
3RZHUVLQ(QJOLVKDQG:HOVK$GPLQLVWUDWLYH/DZ¶LQ0atthew Groves and Greg Weeks (eds), Legitimate 
Expectations in the Common Law World (Hart Publishing 2017). 
31
 See for instance: Dan Simon and Nicholas 6FXULFK µ-XGLFLDO2YHUVWDWLQJ¶  Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 411.  
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book chapters considering the potential perils of the doctrine of substantive expectations than 
there are cases where a public authority has been directed to act in line with its earlier 
representation.32  
4 The SeDUFKIRUµ'HHS¶ Constitutional Principle 
Lord Carnwath also ventures into more theoretical territory. Among the controversies 
surrounding substantive legitimate expectations, there has been a persistent strand of criticism 
that the doctrine suffers from the absence of a clear conceptual footing.33 In recent years, it 
has become almost de rigueur to suggest that such clarity is lacking. In scholarship, there 
KDYH EHHQ WZR EURDG OLQHV RI FULWLFLVP FRQFHUQLQJ WKH GRFWULQH¶V ODFN RI D FRKHUHQW
conceptual basis. First, it has been suggested WKDW WKH GRFWULQH¶V ODFN RI a clear normative 
SXUSRVHUHQGHUVLWµlittle more than a smokescreen for an erratic and subjective assortment of 
MXGLFLDO LGHDV¶. 34  Second, it is also suggested that the doctrine would be assisted by 
identificatiRQ RI VRPH VRUW RI RYHUDUFKLQJ µPHWD-YDOXH¶35  WKDW ZRXOG µprovide invaluable 
guidance to difficult questions concerning the scope and efIHFW RI WKH GRFWULQH¶.36  These 
strands of criticism²potentially warranting some VRUWRIµVHDUFKIRUFRQFHSWV¶ in this area²
have been reaching, as Daly points outDµFUHVFHQGR¶ in recent years.37  Such concerns have 
also been reflected in the Court of Appeal. In a 2005 decision, Laws LJ stated that he was left 
unfulfilled by the present conceptual understanding of the doctrine (as an instrument of 
fairness that existed to protect against the abuse of power)38 that he had used to reach his 
eventual conclusion on the lawfulness of the public autKRULW\¶VDFWLRQVLQWKDWFDVHµI find it 
very unsatisfactory to leave the case there. The conclusion is not merely simple, but 
                                                          
32
 At least in the English and Welsh jurisdiction. See generally: Thomas (n 30).  
33
 See for example: Paul 5H\QROGVµ/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVDQGWKH3URWHFWLRQRI7UXVWLQ3XEOLF2IILFLDOV¶
[2011] Public Law )RUV\WKµ/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQ5HYLVLWHG¶Q:DWVRQQ11). 
34
 Matthew *URYHV µ6XEVWDQWLYH /HJLWLPDWH ([SHFWDWLRQV LQ $XVWUDOLDQ $GPLQLVWUDWLYH /DZ¶  
Melbourne University Law Review 470, 487. 
35
 Daly (n 27). 
36
 Reynolds (n 33) 330. 
37
 Daly (n 27). 
38
 For more detail on this understanding of the doctrine, see: Reynolds (n33-RH7RPOLQVRQµ7KH3UREOHP
ZLWK WKH 7UXVW &RQFHSWLRQ RI WKH 'RFWULQH RI /HJLWLPDWH ([SHFWDWLRQV LQ $GPLQLVWUDWLYH /DZ¶ UK 
Constitutional Law Blog, 22 July 2016) <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/07/22/joe-tomlinson-the-
problem-with-the-trust-conception-of-the-doctrine-of-legitimate-expectations-in-administrative-law/> 
accessed 18 February 2017. 
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simplistic. It is little distance from a purely subjective adjudication « ,W LV VXSHUILFLDO
because iQ WUXWK LW UHYHDOV QR SULQFLSOH¶.39 For Laws LJ, identification of a clear normative 
EDVLV RQH WKDW µlies between the overarching rubric of abuse of power and the concrete 
imperatives of a rule-ERRN¶,40 was required to µmove the law's development a little further 
GRZQWKHURDG¶.41 On this JHQHUDOWRSLFDQGVSHFLILFDOO\µLaws /-¶VVHDUFKIRUDFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
foundation for the prinFLSOHRIOHJLWLPDWHH[SHFWDWLRQ¶,42 Lord Carnwath offers the view that: 
It may, however, be unnecessary to search for deep constitutional underpinning for a 
principle, which, on a narrow view of Coughlan, simply reflects a basic rule of law and 
human conduct that promises relied on by others should be kept. This applies in public law as 
in private law, unless the authority can show good policy reasons in the public interest for 
departing from their promise.43 
The apparent simplicity of this dictum belies the strength of the claim it advances.  
 While it is perfectly valid to reflect upon whether a particular legal principle, new or 
old, possesses virtue,44 to pursue the identification of some sort of overaUFKLQJµPHWD-YDOXH¶45 
WKDWZRXOGµprovide invaluable guidance to difficult questions concerning the scope and effect 
RIWKHGRFWULQH¶46 seems to be misguided for various reasons. It is, as Daly has observed, only 
QRUPDO WKDW WKH µdoctrine may not map clearly onto the various justifications offered for it 
IURPWLPHWRWLPH¶.47 Identifying some sort of meta-value that the doctrine ought to serve also 
risks foreclosing nuanced judicial consideration of the issues presented in a particular case. 
Furthermore, such a theoretical exercise may bH UHSUHVHQWDWLYH RI D ZRUU\LQJ µrationalistic 
propensity among public lawyers to prioritise the universal over the local, the uniform over 
the particular and, ultiPDWHO\SULQFLSOHRYHUSUDFWLFH¶.48 As such, the solution offered from 
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such an exercise may provide the attractive impression of structure, clarity, certainty, and 
comprehensiveness within the doctrine,49 but the courts would inevitably move away from 
sXFK DQ DEVWUDFW VWULFWXUH ZKHQ µseeking to develop a knack and feel¶ for how the newly-
rationalised version of the doctrine would actually work in practice. 50 In this respect, Lord 
CarQZDWK¶V FDXWLRQ WKDW LW PD\ EH µunnecessary to search for deep constitutional 
underpinning for a principle « ZKLFK « VLPSO\ UHIOHFWV D EDVLF rule of law and human 
FRQGXFW¶RXJKWWREHKHHGHG 
5 The Trend of Modern Authority 
Lastly, Lord Carnwath offers an interesting discussion about what he sees as the scope of the 
modern doctrine: 
[T]he trend of modern authority, judicial and academic, favours a narrow interpretation of the 
Coughlan principle, which can be simply stated. Where a promise or representation, which is 
µclear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification¶, has been given to an identifiable 
defined person or group by a public authority for its own purposes, either in return for action 
by the person or group, or on the basis of which the person or group has acted to its 
detriment, the court will require it to be honoured, unless the authority is able to show good 
reasons, judged by the court to be proportionate, to resile from it. In judging proportionality 
the court will take into account any conflict with wider policy issues, particularly those of a 
µmacro-economic¶ or µmacro-politicaO¶ kind.51  
This clear statement of the doctrine is to be welcomed. Indeed, the open recognition of 
the role of proportionality review in the substantive legitimate expectations context is to be 
welcomed²that was a matter that Lord Mance, in the 2008 House of Lords case of R. 
(Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2), preferred to 
µreserve for another case¶GXHWRLWVµovertoneVRIDQRWKHUDUHDRISXEOLFODZ¶.52 Beyond such 
welcome clarity, the introduction of thHLGHDRIDµQDUURZLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶ of what was said in 
Coughlan is valuable. The courts have, effectively, been operating on the basis of a narrow 
interpretation of that judgment since it was handed down²a baked-in culture of judicial 
deference to administration within English public law probably assisted in making this the 
inevitable course of the Coughlan MXGJPHQW¶VWUDMHFWRU\,WLVWKHQSHUKDSVXVHIXOWRKDYHD
                                                          
49
 Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Liberty Fund 1991) 7. 
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label for that practice, one which truthfully reflects how the courts are actually applying the 
doctrine in cases. 
Lord CarnZDWK¶V FKDUDFWHULVDWLRQ RI WKH µQDUURZ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶ of Coughlan DV µthe 
trend of modern aXWKRULW\MXGLFLDODQGDFDGHPLF¶ is fair insofar as it is very much the middle 
ground between sceptics and proponents. $µWUHQG¶LVQRWKRZHYHUconsensus2QH¶VYLHZRI
ZKHWKHU D µQDUURZ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶ DSSURDFK WR VXEVWDQWLYH H[SHFWDWLRQV LV JRRG RU QRW DQG
even the prior question of whether LWLVµQDUURZ¶RUQRWZLOOLQHYLWDEO\KLQJHXSRQKRZRQH
conceives as the appropriate relationship between the courts and executive. This well-worn 
observation²WKDW µEHKLQG HYHU\ WKHRU\ RI DGPLQLVWUDWLYH ODZ WKHUH OLHV D WKHRU\ RI WKH
VWDWH¶53²is almost as old as the study of administrative law itself in the English jurisdiction. 
In terms of how various contested theories of administrative law may offer practical guidance 
as to the correct approach to substantive legitimate expectations, the profundity of that 
Sisyphean task is matched only by its uselessness in offering immediate, helpful answers. For 
now, then, a useful and defensible approach to substantive legitimate expectations must be 
the aim. With this goal in mind, /RUG&DUQZDWK¶VMXGJPHQWUHYHDOVDQDSSURDFKZKLFKLV²in 
view of present discussion, experience, and knowledge²both pragmatic and justified.   
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